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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-1109 
______________ 
 
CHENG BIN CHEN, 
        Petitioner 
          
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision 
and Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (BIA No. A 206-622-147) 
Immigration Judge:  Walter A. Durling 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2015 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 15, 2015) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
____________________ 
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 This matter comes on before this Court on a petition for review of a decision and 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) entered December 17, 2014, 
dismissing an appeal from a decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) finding the 
petitioner, Chen Bin Chen, removable and denying his application for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  
We will deny the petition for review. 
 Chen is a single 30-year old male citizen of the People’s Republic of China.  Since 
2012 Chen has sought to enter the United States both legally and illegally.  He initially 
sought to enter legally by obtaining a student visa.  Between 2012 and 2014 he twice 
applied for student visas to attend Tacoma Community College in Washington State and 
once applied for a student visa to attend the State University of New York.  All of those 
attempts were unsuccessful.  He claims that at about the time of the third rejection of his 
applications for a student visa, the Chinese government began mistreating him because of 
his involvement with an unsanctioned underground Chinese Christian church. 
 Obviously Chen did not regard the rejections of his applications for a student visa 
as final impediments to coming to the United States because, with the assistance of a 
smuggler, he illegally entered the United States from Mexico on or about February 28, 
2014, without inspection or parole.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
reacted to Chen’s illegal entry on March 27, 2014, by serving him with a notice to 
appear, a procedure that initiated removal proceedings.  At a hearing on the removal 
proceedings on April 7, 2014, Chen, who was represented by counsel, admitted that he 
was removable but informed the IJ that he was seeking asylum, withholding of removal, 
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and protection under the CAT.  When the hearing resumed on April 28, 2014, Chen filed 
his application for the above relief.  In his application he asserted that in January 2014, 
the Chinese government began mistreating him because of his participation in the 
underground Christian church. 
 At the outset of the resumed hearing on July 30, 2014, the IJ admitted into 
evidence documents that the DHS supplied including the United States State 
Department’s country reports on human rights in China from 2012 and 2013.  Chen 
testified at the hearing that a friend suggested that he attend a Christian religious meeting 
or service and that he had done so on January 5, 2014.  The following day, January 6, 
2014, he attended another Christian meeting at a parishioner’s home, but the police 
interrupted the meeting and arrested 12 attendees including Chen.   
 Chen claims that the police took him to a local jail and held him for three days, 
beating him with fists and batons so severely as to leave bruises.  During the three-day 
detention, the police interrogated Chen but he refused to give them the names of other 
church members.  After three days the police released him to his parents with an order for 
him to report every three days to a police station to ensure that he was not attending a 
non-sanctioned church. 
 Chen testified that his father made a substantial payment to obtain his release from 
police custody and to a smuggler to get him out of China.  He also testified that he would 
be immediately arrested and jailed if he returned to China because he had left China 
illegally and did not obey the order to report to the police station every three days.  
Further, Chen testified that his family told him that on May 2, 2014, police officers 
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visited his family home and informed his family that they would arrest Chen if he 
returned to China. 
 Chen claimed that after he was released he saw a doctor in China on January 9, 
2014, at which time an x-ray was taken.  But he did not have a copy of the x-ray.  Though 
Chen claimed to be a Christian, he did not provide any documents to the IJ during the 
hearing to support the claim and he did not offer any documents proving that he ever 
attended any church meetings in China.  In fact, he did not produce documents to support 
any of his testimony.  It is significant that Chen had an aunt who lived in New York but 
he did not call her to testify on his behalf even though she could have supported his 
claims, though only on a hearsay basis.   
 The IJ had little problem with the case.  On July 30, 2014, the IJ rejected Chen’s 
claim for asylum and other relief, concluded that Chen was removable, and, ordered Chen 
removed to China.  The IJ concluded that Chen’s claim was implausible and he found 
that Chen was not credible and that he failed to corroborate his claims adequately.  The IJ 
stated, “[w]ell, to put it mildly, this Court thinks this whole case is totally bogus.”  A.R. 
71.  Though the IJ could not say that the incidents that Chen described did not occur, he 
said that “when an individual[’s] testimony is vague in certain aspects, or the claim itself 
begs for corroboration, corroboration should be produced.”  A.R. 72.  The IJ observed 
that Chen was unable to answer numerous questions, prompting the IJ to conclude that 
Chen “did not know all those questions or conveniently forgot.”  A.R. 72.  In this regard, 
the IJ noted that Chen had not obtained anything to corroborate what the IJ called his 
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“convenient” claim, including any type of arrest or police report, or letters from church 
officials or family indicating that he had attended services in China.  Id. 
 The IJ found inconsistencies between Chen’s testimony, where he claimed he 
would be killed if returned to China, and his asylum application, where he indicated that 
he would be jailed if returned.  A.R. 72-73.  The IJ also made the obvious finding that 
Chen’s inability to obtain student visas affected his credibility.  A.R. 74-75.  In this 
regard, we cannot avoid recognizing that Chen contends that he became interested in 
Christianity only after he failed to obtain a student visa to come to the United States.   
 On August 27, 2014, Chen appealed from the IJ’s decision to the Board.  On 
December 17, 2014, the Board dismissed Chen’s appeal, specifically agreeing with the IJ 
that Chen did not provide adequate corroboration of his testimony to meet his burden of 
proof for the granting of asylum or withholding of removal.  In reaching its result, the 
Board cited our decisions in Quao Lin Dong v. Att’y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 229 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2011), and Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001), and noted that, in 
accordance with INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), “where the trier of 
fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise 
credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have 
the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”  A.R. 3.  The Board observed 
that the only corroborative evidence Chen attempted to obtain through his parents in 
China were the x-rays from the hospital, but his parents had been told that he had to 
request the x-rays in person.  A.R. 3.  The Board concluded that Chen made “no other 
efforts to obtain any corroborative evidence,” such as requesting letters from his parents, 
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even though he had been in touch with them.  A.R. 3-4.  The Board noted that Chen’s 
parents could have verified parts of his claims inasmuch as Chen asserted that his father 
had made a payment to get him out of jail and that the police allegedly spoke with his 
parents in their home while he was in police custody.  A.R. 4.  The Board also observed 
that Chen did not ask his aunt, who lived in New York, and who allegedly was aware of 
his problems in China, to testify or even submit a letter on his behalf.  A.R. 4.  Finally, 
the Board agreed with the IJ’s conclusion that Chen had failed to demonstrate that it was 
more likely than not that he would be tortured in China by or with the acquiescence of 
government officials if he returned to China.  Inasmuch as Chen did not have 
corroboration for his case, the Board did not assess his credibility.  Chen then filed the 
petition for review now before us. 
 The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) and we have jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Venue is proper in this Court as the removal proceedings were 
completed in York, Pennsylvania.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).  Chen concedes that if, as 
here, the Board issues its own decision on the merits we review its findings of fact on a 
substantial evidence basis, but he points out that we review its legal conclusions de novo.  
The distinction between factual findings and legal conclusions is not material in this case 
because under any standard of review we would deny Chen’s petition for review. 
 In considering this case, it is clear there is substantial evidence supporting the 
Board’s finding that Chen did not satisfy his burden to obtain relief because he did not 
provide adequate, or, indeed, any corroborating evidence to support his claims.  Chen 
alleged that he had been mistreated in China and that his parents had bailed him out of 
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jail.  He also alleged that in May 2014 his parents had informed him via telephone that 
the police were looking for him in China, and that his aunt in New York knew of his 
experiences in China.  Yet he made no effort to obtain evidence corroborating his claims 
of mistreatment. 
 The Board did not err when it denied Chen relief because he did not corroborate 
his testimony.  Even if Chen had been credible, in the circumstances of this case he 
needed to supply corroborating evidence to meet his burden of proof.  See Chen v. 
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2005).  If it is reasonable to expect that an 
applicant would provide corroboration and if the applicant is given an opportunity to 
explain its absence, failure to corroborate may serve as the basis for the denial of a claim.  
Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2003).  With respect to corroboration 
we have explained that the IJ must engage in the following three-part inquiry:  “(1) an 
identification of facts for which it is reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) an inquiry as 
to whether the applicant has provided information corroborating the relevant facts; and if 
he or she has not; (3) an analysis of whether the applicant has adequately explained his or 
her failure to do so.”  Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 Chen does not deny that the IJ explained what corroboration he expected.  But 
when Chen was asked whether he had obtained corroboration, he acknowledged that he 
had not done so, attributing that failure to the circumstance that he was in detention.  Yet 
we do not understand why he could not have obtained an affidavit from his aunt in New 
York, whom he had told about the incident.  Though his aunt’s affidavit would have been 
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of limited help as she did not have personal knowledge of what had happened to Chen in 
China, still her affidavit would have had at least some value because it would have  
demonstrated that Chen had made his claims before the hearing in these proceedings.  
Moreover, Chen also could have asked his aunt to help him obtain an affidavit from his 
parents, who could have corroborated the fact that they paid to have him released from 
custody, took him to the hospital for treatment, and attempted to obtain Chen’s x-rays.  
Consequently, Chen did not adequately explain why he did not have corroborating 
evidence.  Overall, we can understand why the IJ rejected Chen’s claim for relief.  
Indeed, the timing of the self-created circumstances – i.e., his sudden interest in 
Christianity, on which he bases his claims for asylum and other relief – coming 
immediately after his failure to obtain a student visa suggests that the IJ was correct when 
he determined that Chen’s claim for asylum and other relief was meritless. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will deny the petition for review of the decision and 
order of the Board of December 17, 2014. 
